2 since the Vietnam era. Today the cross-domain conundrum is still a major impediment to effective C2.
A Foot in Each Camp
It is not difficult to see the C2 challenges that result from having information segmented by classification. In 1970, WWMCCS terminated at the component command level and there were only two main information silos to contend withoperations and intelligence. Horizontal and vertical proliferation of networks and computing platforms in all joint capability areas forces commanders to have a foot in each camp. 2 Force application and C2 data are native to the Secure Internet Protocol
Router Network (SIPRNet). Battlespace awareness data originates largely on the Joint
Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). Logistics data resides on
Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet). At the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, access to all three is a necessity.
Merely having access is not enough, however. Operational and strategic planning requires the fusion of multi-disciplinary information from data stores located in different security domains throughout the Defense enterprise. Processing data requires system access. Execution at the joint and component levels requires situational awareness and collaboration across the same security domains. Orders and instructions issued during point-to-point telephone calls secured with end-to-end encryption are relics of the past. C2 nodes communicate across data networks using chat, video teleconferencing, shared session collaborative tools, portals, and voice. The participants reside on disparate domains. We have long since exceeded the human capacity to fuse information and make decisions without some automated assistance or information technology intervention. The information has to move to a common 3 computing environment somehow. Seamless access to information will facilitate communication and understanding with mission partners and allow commanders to synthesize information more quickly and easily and create a decision advantage. 3 Commanders and staffs cannot handle operations across two, three, or four domains even under optimal conditions. There are more camps to occupy than they have feet. Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) operations add security domains to the information architecture, raising the level of complexity well Office), and STONE GHOST (US-Australia-Canada-UK), to name a few. 
Short Term Solutions
System Design for Multi-Domain Operations
The biggest deficiency in cross-domain solutions is poor characterization of the requirements. Optimal system design is wholly dependent on effective system analysis.
If the cross-domain requirements are not represented in the capability architecture, the participating systems will lack the requisite conditions for exchanges across security domain boundaries. A step-by-step examination of a generic C2 capability illustrates this.
System A ( Figure 1 ) processes and displays tracking data for display within a common operational picture. It ingests event data from any number of sources and stores it in its database in a prescribed format. Subsystems process (P) and display (D) the event data, producing a view of the events that users observe at their workstation.
In Figure 1 , System A operates within one security domain (unclassified, in this example). To provide a common operational picture (COP) for both unclassified and classified networks, the organization deploys a second instance of the same system. System B has the same architecture as System A. Users access the unclassified COP on a NIPRNet workstation, and the classified COP on a SIPRNet workstation (Figure 2 ).
Figure 2. System in Two Security Domains
To view the unclassified and classified COPs on the same workstation, the organization can employ a multiple security level (MSL) capability. System C, which resides on the highest classified network, has trusted connections to other networks.
System C does not process either COP, it merely brings a view of the System A and System B environments to a common display ( Figure 3 ). Although the user at a System C workstation sees both the unclassified and classified COP on the same screen, they are still two separate views. The data is not integrated. To integrate the unclassified and classified COP, the organization adds System G, a high assurance guard, to transfer unclassified data to System B ( Figure 4 ).
External capabilities that produce event data send it to System G in the appropriate format. System B adds Subsystem T, which transforms the data coming out of the guard into the schema needed to store, process, and display it. The result is a COP with unclassified and classified events integrated into the same view (V US ). sound future investments for strategic and operational activities with at least semipermanent facilities, adequate support staff, and user populations who perform complex, cross-discipline analysis. As a wholesale solution for commanders and staffs who need occasional access to the native trusted computing environment, MLS solutions are cost-prohibitive.
As the preceding examples demonstrate, the majority of specifications that conform a system to multi-domain operations exist not within the CDS, but within the overall C2 capability. If the operational viewpoints do not reflect a multi-domain operating environment, the resulting system analysis will not lead to a design that supports information sharing across security domain boundaries. CDS cannot, and
should not, supply all the artifacts missing from the capability architecture. How data moves across the guards should be manifest in the standards viewpoints. The services viewpoint describes how the transfers occur, even when the CDS is outside of the core capability architecture. The data and information viewpoint establishes how the system will maintain integrity and consistency across all system instances in separate security domains.
Shortfalls in Interoperability Certification
Chairman Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum 161-03, 19 the PASS architecture will provide COP data exchanges with other security domains for both Services. 20 PASS is also the connection point to Command Post of the Future (CPOF), which provides multiechelon collaboration among similarly equipped operational units. CPOF is highly interoperable within the land component families of systems, yet still lacks the native design to achieve C2 exchanges across multiple security domains. 21 
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The Navy's Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) Evolutionary Development (OED) is an MLS solution with a systems architecture and logical data model similar to JIOC-I. 22 Originally fielded in shore-based joint and naval intelligence A better short term approach for unstructured data (or data that is not timecritical) is an expansion of AMHS or an adapted parallel capability designed for highspeed, reliable, and secure cross-domain transfers. AMHS already incorporates the prerequisite system functions necessary to operate in multiple security domains simultaneously. The National Gateway Center at Fort Detrick ensures interoperability with allies, coalition partners, non-DOD agencies, and other non-DOD U.S. and foreign organizations. It has data transformation functions, data integrity controls, and synchronization mechanisms. The means by which AMHS delivers official message traffic to other domains based on security labeling can be extended to facilitate deterministic transfers of files and other data packages with high integrity and nonrepudiation. 32 Information assurance controls already exist for malware scanning.
AMHS implements role-based access and confidentiality measures through the DOD public key infrastructure and is Protection Level 3 33 certified. Role functions could be extended to assure two-person review of packages before transfer, and the current releaser role could be tailored for approvals by foreign disclosure officers in standard operations, or personally by commanders in exigent circumstances. Users interact with AMHS via web clients, eliminating the need for proximity to custom workstations to conduct transfers. No removable media would be involved in these automated exchanges, which eliminates that vector from the vulnerability array of the system. If used in conjunction with MLS data stores, the movement of data from one domain to another could be on-demand and fully automated. Although a comprehensive capacity and performance study is necessary to ensure high availability, the fundamental subsystems for cross-domain interoperability are already present.
Long Term Strategy
Enterprise Cross-Domain Services
The DOD objective capability is enterprise-level cross-domain services that operate within a service-oriented architecture. CDS on the Global Information Grid (GIG) would no longer be point-to-point interfaces; rather, they would be discoverable based on solution attributes and remotely invoked by service calls made by C2 systems on behalf of the user. The Defense Information System Agency (DISA) and Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) will consolidate CDS into cross-domain service centers, coupled together on a common services bus, and connected to reliable high bandwidth fast transport. The system will deliver messages to the desired destinations seamlessly by determining the best device and location to perform the cross-domain service. 34 Delivery may be synchronous or asynchronous, depending on mission requirements and data pedigree. The cross-domain enterprise will also provide information discovery, collaboration, and information technology management across security domains to support core C2 functions. The UCDMO has been efficacious in providing uniform solutions and at less overall cost to the government. 38 The DOD Chief Information Officer directed all
Components to form their own Cross Domain Support Element (CDSE) to be the focal point for all cross-domain related activities in their respective organizations. 39 Despite these efforts, there is no shortage of impediments to suitable CDS for C2 at all levels.
Critiques and criticisms of existing CDS come from all disciplines and communities.
Notwithstanding the common shortfalls in C2 system design which impose requirements back on CDS developers, there are other legitimate considerations for future interoperability between security domains. 41 However, it is unlikely that more implicit terms than "damage," "serious damage," and "exceptionally grave damage" 42 would make much of a difference, since less than 1 percent of the classification decisions made in DOD are original. 43 Even if information security mechanisms could provide adequate security in a purely role-based environment (that is, if classifications were eliminated altogether), the burden of managing complex role memberships throughout the DOD enterprise would be paralyzing. Some general categorizations of information are necessary to make personnel management (clearance and vetting), classification procedures, and information system design practical. Because the potential user base is so diverse, approaches that rest on the principle that a user requesting access should be known a priori are generally ineffective. Instead, the critical issue in such an environment is not "Who exactly is this requester," but "Do I trust this requester to share my resource?"
The properties or attributes possessed by the requesting users, such as clearance, are more relevant to characterizing them and determining whether or not they should be trusted. 44 Adjusting the current classifications and dissemination controls to better reflect defense operating environments would be more pragmatic than a reform of the entire system, such as the recent addition of the Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) category in Executive Order 13556. 45 
Conclusion
Commanders have operated in multiple security domains since the advent of national security classification structures and C2 systems. Planning, execution, and control in JIIM environments demands the movement of information between the security domains of all participants. In the short term, CDS can facilitate the requisite transfers for systems designated to operate at multiple security levels or with multilevel security, but three short term measures are still necessary. First, capability developers must represent cross-domain requirements properly during system analysis and design.
Second, interoperability certification processes in the DOD components must require explicit identification of cross-domain requirements, and architectures must reflect these operational requirements so the necessary resource flows are incorporated into system design. Third, MSL systems with extensible cross-domain capabilities, such as AMHS, should expand their functions to provide cross-domain capability to commanders until multilevel security solutions become more prevalent and less costly. In the long term, capability developers should incorporate enterprise cross-domain services into objective architectures, in anticipation of DISA and DODIIS provisioning fast, reliable, and centralized guard farms. In addition, research and development efforts beyond the 2013 Future Years Defense Program call for domain convergence solutions which
